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Introduction
In one-machine sequencing sitnations ca.ch agent (player) has one job that has to be processed on a single machine Gacti joh is specified by its processing time, the time the machine takes to handle the job. We assume that the cost of a player depend linearly on the completion time of his job. Furthermore, there is an initial order on the jobs of the agents before the processing of the machine starts.
Each group of agents (coalition) is allowed to obtain i:ost savings by rearranging their jobs in a way t1raL is adniissiblc with respect to the initial order. By defining the worth of a coalition as the maximmn cost savings a coalition can make by adrrrissible rearrangements, we obtain a cooperative game called sequencing game, related to the one machine sequencing situation. This game theoretic approach has been taken in Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (l989~. They also defined thc EGS (equal gain splitting) rule on the class of sequencing situations to obtain a division of the value of the grand coalition.
It has been shown that the ECS rvle is in the core of the corresponding sequencing In this paper an alternative characterization for the EGS rule is presented. For this purpose we introducc thc class 7-l of coalitions of the form {1,...,i} or {i -} 1,...,n}, 1 C i C n-1. The EGS rule will be characterized by efirciency and the fair head-tail split property. A division rulc satisfies the fair head-tail property if the marginal benefits of a union of each head and its complement is equally shared. Further, the set ?-[ yields a generalized core. It is shown that this core is the convex hull of 2n-r vectors and that the EGS rule is the average of these vectors. It is shown that the general nucleolus with respect to~(, as introduced by Mnschler, Potters and Tijs (1992) , coincides with the EGS rule. Finally, necessary and sufficient conditions for the ECS rule to coincide with the ntrcleolus are given.
Sequencing situations and the EGS rule
This sectiou describes sequencing situations and the corresponding sequencing games.
Further, we recall the definition of the EGS rule and some well known facts írom game theory. For the EGS rule we givc a new characterizatiou by efficiency and the fair head-tail split property.
In a one machine sequencing situa.tion therc is a queue of agents, each with one job, to be processed by one mac:hine 7'he finite set of agents is denoted by N-{1,...,n}.
'1'he position of the agents in thc que~ue is described by a bijection Q: N--~{ 1, ..., n}. (ii) tlre players of S are not allowed to jump over players outside S:
Specifically, Q(i) -j ineans
'1'he set of admissible reaa~rangenrents for a coalitiou S is denoted by~.5. 
A game (N, v) is called supern,dditive if for all coalitions .S,T E 2N with S n T-~l we h ave v(S u I')~v(S) -~v(T)
Coopera
xi -v(N) and x(S) ) v(S) for all S E 2N.
iEN where x(S) -~;Ey :r;. The core C(v) consists of all core elements. A game is called balanced if its core is non-empt,y.
For the nucleolus of a game, introduced by Schnaeidler ( 1969J, we need the following notation. Let. h' :-( F~)-~.E.ZN, wltcrc~h~~is thc~cxccss functiou corresponding to T defincd by FT(x) :-i~(S) -.r(5').`l'Irc~fuuction O : RZn -~RZn is thc map that ordcrs Lhc
coordinates in a weakly decreasing order. Then thc nucleolus of a game ( N,v) is defincd by~( (198.9J showed that a scquencing game is superadditive ( even convex) and that the EGS rule is in the corc of the seyucucing gamc. Moreover, they provided a. charactcriza.tion of t.hc I;G~rnle liy using c~fkicicncy, cliimnry Irropcrt,y, cquivalcnccp rupi~rtY~tn~l~witch prupcrty.`4r~~will e;iv~, a.n ul,hcr cha.ra.ctt~rizat,iuii in tcrnis uf c~(Iicic~nc.Y and thc fain c~ad-tail split prupcrl,y. 
N,v) -{x E I(v)~O o h(x)~~O o f~(y) for all y E I(v)} where I(v) :-{x~x(N) -v(N),x(i)~v(i.) for all i E N} is the imputation set of (N,v).

Ilence, a({k} ) -~ik(v) -GGS~.( N, p, a) for all !~E N~{n}. hrorn the efGciency it follows immediately that x({n}) -EGS"(N,p.a). O
3 The head tail core
In this section the head tail core is introduced. We characterize the extreme points of this set and show that the T;GS rule is the average of these extreme points.
'1'hc hca.d ta.il com CN(r~) uf .r. sc,ciuc~ur~ing ga.ntc~(N, rr) is dafined hy
C~N(i') -{:r E R"~.r(N) -r~(N)..r(,ti') 1 n(S) fur all S E~-l}. (5)
Obviously, we have that the corc C(v) of the game (N,v) is contained in the head tail core Cx(v). Thc following examplc, shows tha1, I,he core of a game can be a strict subset of the hcad tail core. 
The dual game (N, v') of (N, v) is dcfiued by v'(S) -v(N) -v(S`) for all S C N. Note that v(N) -v"(N) and that v(S) G v'(S)
for all S by the superadditivity of (N,v). 
.,i}) ĩ E J
Then E-{h'r~J C N} is thc act of cxt,rcurc t~uints of C~(~n). Conscqueutly, we ha.vc
Theorem 2 CN(v) -corav{h.J~Ir.J E G}.
where hJ corresponds lo IJLe 3012L1io7LR of the set, of equations
The number of extreme points is 2~r1 where I-{i E N~v({1,...,i})~v'({1,...,i})}.
Hence, in the generic case we have 2n-' different extreme points since v`(N) -v(N)
and consequently n~I.
The following theorcro shows tha.t, the averagc of the extreme points of the head tail core generated by (6) is the I~~GS rule. The following example shows that the EGS rule is not necessarily equal to the nucleolus of a sequencing game. From this and thc fac-t, Lhat I,hc, ECS-rule is Lhe unique rule that satisfies efficiency and the fair head-tail property, it, follows that, the nucleolus is equal to the allocation given by the T:GS-rulc whcn for all i E N`{n} thc rnaximum in thc definition of s;;~~is achieved aL 'l' -{ 1...., i} aiirl the in~~xirnuin in Lhe definition of s;~~; is achieved at T-{i~1,...,ti} when we take~a~to be equal to the allocation given by the LGS-ru}e.
Since only connected coalitions have to be considered for these rnaxima we obtain the following inequalities. 
These reduce to
G{t,...,P-t}x{itt....,n} C G{~,...,P-i}x{p,...,i} for all 1 G p G i G n iZ C~{~,...,r-i}x{~t~,...,~~} C~~{F.,...,~}x{tt~,...,~~} fur all 1 G p G i G ta.
which proves the if part.
In the only iC part we ha.vc tha.t I;C4 ( N,~i, rr) -r~( N, v) . The efficiency and thc head-tail fairnc~ss in~~rlii~s tha.t t.hc~n~a.xiimm~in thi,~Ic~liiiil,ion uf .ti;; fi is ac~hic~vr~d at, 7' -{1,...,i} ancl thc rnaximuni in the de(inil.icni uf s;t~; is a.chicved at 'I' -{i f I,...,n}. l~rom Lhe if part follows the result immediately. O
